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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The plaintiffs in these two cases filed suit in state 
court against health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") organized 
by U.S. Healthcare, Inc., claiming damages, under various 
theories, for injuries arising from the medical malpractice of 
HMO-affiliated hospitals and medical personnel.  The defendant 
HMOs removed both cases to federal court, arguing (1) that the 
injured person in each case had obtained medical care as a 
benefit from a welfare-benefit plan governed by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.  
§ 1001-1461 (1988), (2) that removal is proper under the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987), 
"complete preemption" exception to the "well-pleaded complaint 
rule," and (3) that the plaintiffs' claims are preempted by 
§ 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  The district courts 
agreed with these contentions and dismissed the plaintiffs' 
claims against the HMOs.  The plaintiffs appeal those rulings and 
ask that their claims against the HMOs be remanded to state 
court. 
 We hold that on the record before us, the plaintiffs' 
claims are not claims "to recover [plan] benefits due . . . under 
the terms of [the] plan, to enforce . . . rights under the terms 
  
of the plan, or to clarify . . . rights to future benefits under 
the terms of the plan" as those phrases are used in 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  Accordingly, 
we hold that Metropolitan Life's "complete preemption" exception 
is inapplicable and that removal of these claims from state court 
was improper.  We will reverse the judgments of the district 
courts and will remand each case to district court with 
instructions to remand the cases to the state courts from which 
they were removed. 
 
 I. 
 A. 
 Suffering from various ailments, Darryl Dukes visited 
his primary care physician, defendant Dr. William W. Banks, M.D., 
who identified a problem with Darryl's ears.  A few days later, 
Banks performed surgery and prepared a prescription ordering that 
blood studies be performed.  Darryl presented that prescription 
to the laboratory of Germantown Hospital and Medical Center but 
the hospital refused to perform the tests.  The record does not 
reveal the reasons for the hospital's refusal. 
 The next day, Darryl sought treatment from defendant 
Dr. Edward B. Hosten, M.D. at the Charles R. Drew Mental Health 
Center, who also ordered a blood test.  This time, the test was 
performed.  Darryl's condition nevertheless continued to worsen 
and he died shortly thereafter.  Darryl's blood sugar level was 
extremely high at the time of his death.  That condition 
  
allegedly would have or could have been diagnosed through a 
timely blood test. 
 Darryl received his medical treatment through the 
United States Health Care Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc., a 
federally qualified health maintenance organization organized by 
U.S. Healthcare.  As a qualified HMO under the federal Health 
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17 
(1988), this U.S. Healthcare HMO provides basic and supplemental 
health services to its members on a pre-paid basis.1  As is often 
the case, Darryl received his membership in the HMO through his 
participation in an ERISA-covered welfare plan sponsored by his 
employer. 
 Darryl's wife, Cecilia Dukes, brought suit in state 
court alleging medical malpractice and other negligence against 
numerous defendants, including Banks, Hosten, the Germantown 
Hospital, and the Drew Center.  She also brought suit against the 
HMO, alleging that as the organization through which Darryl 
received his medical treatment, it was responsible, under a 
                     
1
.  HMOs often contain costs through a strategy known as 
"utilization review."  See generally John D. Blum, An Analysis of 
Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case 
Management, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 191, 192-93 (1989); Susan J. Stayn, 
Note, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance 
Organizations:  Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1674, 1677-83 (1994).  Unlike 
traditional insurance policies, HMOs usually decide whether to 
reimburse patients for medical care prospectively -- through 
utilization or "pre-certification" review.  The HMO may either 
perform the utilization review itself or assign the task to a 
third-party contractor.  Id. at 1681; see also Corcoran v. United 
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 812 (1992). 
  
Pennsylvania state law ostensible agency theory (the "agency 
theory"), for the negligence of the various doctors and other 
medical-service providers.  See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical 
Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that 
an HMO may be held liable for malpractice under an ostensible 
agency theory where a patient looks to the HMO for care and the 
HMO's conduct leads the patient to reasonably believe that he or 
she is being treated by an employee of the HMO).  She alleged 
further that the HMO failed to exercise reasonable care in 
selecting, retaining, screening, monitoring, and evaluating the 
personnel who actually provided the medical services (the "direct 
negligence theory"). 
 The HMO removed the case to district court pursuant to 
the Metropolitan Life complete-preemption exception to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule."  In its notice of removal, it claimed 
that the HMO is part of -- or at least plays a role in -- the 
ERISA plan to provide health benefits and that Dukes' claims, 
properly construed, "are directed to the structure and operation 
of the employer benefit plan."  (Dukes app. at 31.)  In its view, 
Dukes' claims therefore "relate to" the welfare plan and 
accordingly are preempted under ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(a). 
 Dukes moved for a remand and the HMO moved to dismiss.  
The district court denied Dukes' motion and granted the HMO's,  
explaining that Dukes' claims "related to" an ERISA plan -- and 
thus were preempted -- because (1) "any ostensible agency claim 
must be made on the basis of what the benefit plan provides and 
  
is therefore 'related' to it" and (2) "the treatment received 
must be measured against the benefit plan and is therefore also 
'related' to it."  Dukes v. United States Health Care Sys., Inc., 
848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  It remanded to state court 
the remainder of Dukes' claims against the other defendants.  Id. 
at 43. 
 
 B. 
 Ronald and Linda Visconti are the biological parents of 
Serena Visconti, who was stillborn.  During the third trimester 
of her pregnancy with Serena, Linda apparently developed symptoms 
typical of preeclampsia.  The Viscontis claim that Linda's 
obstetrician, Dr. Wisniewski, negligently ignored these symptoms 
and that this negligence caused Serena's death. 
 Like Darryl Dukes, Linda received her medical treatment 
through a federally qualified HMO organized by U.S. Healthcare.  
This HMO was called the Health Maintenance Organization of 
Pennsylvania/New Jersey.  The Viscontis received their membership 
in the HMO through an ERISA-covered welfare plan.   
 Ronald Visconti, as administrator of Serena's estate, 
and Ronald and Linda, in their own right (collectively, "the 
Viscontis"), brought suit in the Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas.  They attempted to hold the HMO liable for Dr. 
Wisniewski's malpractice under ostensible and actual agency 
theories, alleging that when Linda became pregnant, the HMO held 
out Dr. Wisniewski as a competent and qualified participating 
obstetrician/gynecologist.  They also sued the HMO under a direct 
  
negligence theory, claiming, among other things, that the HMO was 
negligent in its selection, employment, and oversight of the 
medical personnel who performed the actual medical treatment. 
 The HMO removed the case to federal court, asserting 
that the Viscontis' claims were completely preempted by ERISA.  
It then filed a motion to dismiss, and the Viscontis filed a 
motion to remand, contending that removal was improper and that 
ERISA did not preempt their state law claims.  The district court 
denied the Viscontis' motion but granted the HMO's motion to 
dismiss.  Visconti ex rel. Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. 
Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 The Visconti and Dukes cases have been consolidated on 
appeal. 
 
 II. 
 The HMOs removed these cases to federal court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, alleging that the district courts had 
original jurisdiction over the claims, because the claims 
"[arose] under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United 
States."  § 1441(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  To determine whether a 
claim "arises under" federal law -- and thus is removable -- we 
begin with the "well-pleaded complaint rule."  See Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); see also 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Security Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d 
Cir. 1989).   
 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a cause of 
action "arises under" federal law, and removal is proper, only if 
  
a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's 
properly pleaded complaint.  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983).  A federal 
defense to a plaintiff's state law cause of action ordinarily 
does not appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint, and, 
therefore, usually is insufficient to warrant removal to federal 
court.  Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115-18 (1936).  
Thus, it is well-established that the defense of preemption 
ordinarily is insufficient justification to permit removal to 
federal court.  Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398 
(1987) ("The fact that a defendant might ultimately prove that a 
plaintiff's claims are pre-empted under [a federal statute] does 
not establish that they are removable to federal court."). 
 The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the 
well-pleaded complaint rule -- the "complete preemption" 
exception -- under which "Congress may so completely pre-empt a 
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select 
group of claims is necessarily federal in character."  
Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 63-64; see generally Goepel v. 
National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 309-13 (3d Cir. 
1994) (discussing the Court's complete-preemption jurisprudence 
and holding that the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act did 
not completely preempt plaintiffs' state law claims), cert. 
denied, 131 L. Ed. 2d. 555 (1995); Allstate, 879 F.2d at 93-94 
(holding that the complete-preemption exception did not apply in 
a situation where an insurance company plaintiff sought 
contribution from an ERISA plan because § 502 of ERISA does not 
  
provide an express cause of action vindicating the interest that 
the suit sought to protect and enforce); Railway Labor Executives 
Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 939-43 
(3d Cir. 1988) (discussing the Court's complete-preemption 
doctrine and holding that neither the Railway Labor Act nor the 
Interstate Commerce Act completely preempted plaintiffs' state 
law fraudulent conveyance claims against railroads and railroad 
officials).  The complete preemption doctrine applies when  
 the pre-emptive force of [the federal 
statutory provision] is so powerful as to 
displace entirely any state cause of action 
[addressed by the federal statute].  Any such 
suit is purely a creature of federal law, 
notwithstanding the fact that state law would 
provide a cause of action in the absence of 
[the federal provision]. 
 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23.  Claims to enforce a 
collective-bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, present a 
typical example of the complete-preemption doctrine at work:  In 
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Court 
ruled that any claims to enforce a collective-bargaining 
agreement -- even when phrased as a state law cause of action to 
enforce a contract -- are removable to federal court.   
 The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended 
the complete-preemption doctrine to apply to state law causes of 
action which fit within the scope of ERISA's civil-enforcement 
provisions.2  Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 66.  It explained: 
                     
2
.  ERISA's "six carefully integrated civil enforcement 
provisions" are found in § 502.  Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).  The statutory provision 
  
 [T]he legislative history consistently sets 
out [Congress's] clear intention to make 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants 
or beneficiaries federal questions for the 
purposes of federal court jurisdiction in 
like manner as § 301 of [the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185.]  For 
example, Senator Williams, a sponsor of 
ERISA, emphasized that the civil enforcement 
section would enable participants and 
beneficiaries to bring suit to recover 
benefits denied contrary to the terms of the 
plan and that when they did so "[i]t is 
intended that such actions will be regarded 
as arising under the laws of the United 
States, in a similar fashion to those brought 
under section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act." 
 
481 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted).  Thus, courts have found that 
the Metropolitan Life complete-preemption doctrine permits 
removal of state law causes of action in a host of different 
ERISA-related circumstances.  See id. at 63-67 (holding that 
state common law causes of action asserting improper processing 
of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are 
(..continued) 
relevant for the purposes of this appeal, § 502(a)(1)(B), states 
in pertinent part: 
 
 (a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action 
 
 A civil action may be brought -- 
 
 (1) by a participant or beneficiary -- 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (B) to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan, to 
enforce his rights under the terms 
of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan . . . . 
  
removable to federal court); Anderson v. Electronic Data Sys. 
Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir.) (holding that removal was 
proper because state law claim alleging that plan fiduciary was 
demoted and terminated for refusing to violate ERISA fell within 
§ 502(a)(2) & (3)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 55 (1994); Sofo v. 
Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239, 240-41 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(plaintiff's state court rescission claim against a group 
insurance policy for the policy's refusal to reimburse plaintiff 
for medical treatment received was properly removed because 
plaintiff's claim was for a denial of benefits); Smith v. Dunham-
Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 8-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (common law claim for 
breach of an oral promise to pay pension-related benefits 
properly removed to federal court); Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 
941, 943-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's state law claim 
challenging the calculation of his time of "uninterrupted 
service" for the purposes of calculating his pension benefits 
held removable), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1011 (1990). 
 That the Supreme Court has recognized a limited 
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for state law claims 
which fit within the scope of § 502 by no means implies that all 
claims preempted by ERISA are subject to removal.  Instead, as 
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote recently, 
"[r]emoval and preemption are two distinct concepts."  Warner v. 
Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1995).  Section 514 of 
ERISA defines the scope of ERISA preemption, providing that ERISA 
"supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in  
  
[§ 4(a) of ERISA] and not exempt under [§ 4(b) of ERISA]."  
(Emphasis added.)  The Metropolitan Life complete-preemption 
exception, on the other hand, is concerned with a more limited 
set of state laws, those which fall within the scope of ERISA's 
civil enforcement provision, § 502.  State law claims which fall 
outside of the scope of § 502, even if preempted by § 514(a), are 
still governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and, therefore, 
are not removable under the complete-preemption principles 
established in Metropolitan Life.  See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. at 23-27 (holding that preemption under § 514(a) does not 
permit a defendant to remove a suit brought in state court to 
federal court when the plaintiff's state claim does not fall 
within the scope of ERISA's civil remedy provisions); 
Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64 (stating that ERISA preemption 
under § 514(a) "without more, does not convert [a] state claim 
into an action arising under federal law"); see also  Allstate, 
879 F.2d at 93-94 (holding that § 514(a) preemption defense will 
not justify removal unless claim falls within the scope of 
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502); Warner, 46 F.3d at 
535 (that a claim is preempted under § 514(a) does not 
necessarily establish that the claim is removable); Lupo v. Human 
Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1994) (state 
law professional malpractice claim against company hired by 
plaintiff's employer to provide psychotherapy services deemed 
outside the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) and therefore not removable). 
 The difference between preemption and complete 
preemption is important.  When the doctrine of complete 
  
preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff's state claim is 
arguably preempted under § 514(a), the district court, being 
without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute 
regarding preemption.  It lacks power to do anything other than 
remand to the state court where the preemption issue can be 
addressed and resolved.  Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 4, 27-28; 
Allstate, 879 F.2d at 94; Warner, 46 F.3d at 533-35; Lupo, 28 
F.3d at 274. 
 
 III. 
 The district courts in these cases found that the 
plaintiffs' state law claims against the U.S. Healthcare HMOs 
fall within the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B) and that the Metropolitan 
Life complete-preemption doctrine therefore permits removal.3  We 
disagree.   
 To determine whether the state law claims fall within 
the scope of § 502(a)(1)(B), we must determine whether those 
claims, properly construed, are "to recover benefits due . . . 
under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce . . . rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify . . . rights to future benefits 
under the terms of the plan."  In making that determination, it 
would be helpful to have a complete understanding in each case of 
the relationships among the HMO, the employer, and the other 
                     
3
.  There is no contention that the plaintiffs' state law claims 
implicate any of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions other than 
those set out in § 502(a)(1)(B).  Accordingly, we direct our 
discussion to whether the plaintiffs' claims fall within the 
scope of § 502(a)(1)(B). 
  
defendants, the nature of the plan benefits, and the rights of 
participants and beneficiaries under the plan.  We are somewhat 
hampered here because these cases come to us on appeal from 
orders granting motions to dismiss.  Because of this procedural 
status, the parties have had little chance to develop the records 
and, accordingly, we know very little about the nature of the 
plan benefits or about the role -- if any -- that U.S. 
Healthcare's HMOs play in the respective ERISA welfare plans.   
 We recognize that there are issues in dispute.  The 
plaintiffs and the Department of Labor as amicus curie, for 
example, claim that the U.S. Healthcare HMOs are separate from 
the ERISA plans and that the sole benefit that participants and 
beneficiaries receive from each plan is the plaintiffs' 
membership in the HMOs.  In their view, the plaintiffs' claims 
thus have nothing at all to do with § 502(a)(1)(B) because no one 
contests that the plaintiffs in fact have received their plan 
benefits (their membership in the HMO).  Instead, under their 
view, the plaintiffs' claims merely attack the behavior of an 
entity completely external to the ERISA plan. 
   U.S. Healthcare, on the other hand, claims that the 
plan benefits are more than just the plan participants' or 
beneficiaries' memberships in the respective HMOs; it argues that 
the medical care received is itself the plan benefit.  As a 
corollary to that position, it also disagrees with the 
plaintiffs' view that the HMOs are completely distinct from the 
respective ERISA plans, arguing that the HMOs in fact play a role 
in the delivery of plan benefits.  It further maintains that 
  
ERISA is implicated because both the plaintiffs' agency claims 
and their direct negligence claims relate to the quality of the 
plan benefits and the HMOs' role as the entity that arranges for 
those benefits for the ERISA plans. 
 We need not here resolve these disputes about how to 
characterize the plan benefits or the HMOs' role in the 
respective ERISA plans.  We will assume, without deciding, that 
the medical care provided (and not merely the plaintiffs' 
memberships in the respective HMOs) is the plan benefit for the 
purposes of ERISA.  We will also assume that the HMOs, either as 
a part of or on behalf of the ERISA plans, arrange for the 
delivery of those plan benefits.  We thus assume, for example, 
that removal jurisdiction would exist if the plaintiffs were 
alleging that the HMOs refused to provide the services to which 
membership entitled them.   
 Given those assumptions, we nevertheless conclude that 
removal was improper.  We are compelled to this conclusion 
because the plaintiffs' claims, even when construed as U.S. 
Healthcare suggests, merely attack the quality of the benefits 
they received:  The plaintiffs here simply do not claim that the 
plans erroneously withheld benefits due.  Nor do they ask the 
state courts to enforce their rights under the terms of their 
respective plans or to clarify their rights to future benefits.  
As a result, the plaintiffs' claims fall outside of the scope of 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and these cases must be remanded to the state 
courts from which they were removed.   
 
  
 A. 
 Nothing in the complaints indicates that the plaintiffs 
are complaining about their ERISA welfare plans' failure to 
provide benefits due under the plan.  Dukes does not allege, for 
example, that the Germantown Hospital refused to perform blood 
studies on Darryl because the ERISA plan refused to pay for those 
studies.  Similarly, the Viscontis do not contend that Serena's 
death was due to their welfare plan's refusal to pay for or 
otherwise provide for medical services.  Instead of claiming that 
the welfare plans in any way withheld some quantum of plan 
benefits due, the plaintiffs in both cases complain about the low 
quality of the medical treatment that they actually received and 
argue that the U.S. Healthcare HMO should be held liable under 
agency and negligence principles. 
 We are confident that a claim about the quality of a 
benefit received is not a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) to "recover 
benefits due . . . under the terms of [the] plan."  To reach that 
conclusion, "we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory 
construction with the text of the provision in question, and move 
on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which 
it occurs."  New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., Nos. 93-1408, 93-1414, 93-
1415, 1995 WL 238409, at *6 (April 26, 1995).   
 The text lends no support to U.S. Healthcare's 
argument.  On its face, a suit "to recover benefits due . . . 
under the terms of [the] plan" is concerned exclusively with 
whether or not the benefits due under the plan were actually 
  
provided.  The statute simply says nothing about the quality of 
benefits received.   
 Nor does anything in the legislative history, 
structure, or purpose of ERISA suggest that Congress viewed 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) as creating a remedy for a participant injured by 
medical malpractice.  When Congress enacted ERISA it was 
concerned in large part with the various mechanisms and 
institutions involved in the funding and payment of plan 
benefits.  That is, Congress was concerned "that owing to the 
inadequacy of current minimum [financial and administrative] 
standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to 
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered."  § 2, 
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  Thus, Congress sought to assure that 
promised benefits would be available when plan participants had 
need of them and § 502 was intended to provide each individual 
participant with a remedy in the event that promises made by the 
plan were not kept.  We find nothing in the legislative history 
suggesting that § 502 was intended as a part of a federal scheme 
to control the quality of the benefits received by plan 
participants.  Quality control of benefits, such as the health 
care benefits provided here, is a field traditionally occupied by 
state regulation and we interpret the silence of Congress as 
reflecting an intent that it remain such.  See, e.g., Travelers 
Ins. Co., 1995 WL 238409, at *7 (noting that while quality 
standards and work place regulations in the context of hospital 
services will indirectly affect the sorts of benefits an ERISA 
plan can afford, they have traditionally been left to the states, 
  
and there is no indication in ERISA that Congress chose to 
displace general health care regulation by the states). 
 
 B. 
 We also reject the HMOs' attempts to characterize the 
plaintiffs' state court complaints as attempts to enforce their 
"rights under the terms of the [respective welfare] plan[s]."  
That phrase is included, we believe, so as to provide a means of 
enforcing any contract rights other than the right to benefits, 
as for example the various plan-created rights of plan 
participants to benefit-claim and benefit-eligibility procedures.  
Just as § 502(a)(1)(B) provides the means by which a participant 
can insist on the promised benefits, so too does it provide the 
means for insisting on the plan-created rights other than plan 
benefits.4 
                     
4
.  ERISA ordinarily requires that welfare plans set out a 
description of the rights of the participants and their 
beneficiaries in a summary plan description ("SPD").  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1022(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (the plan 
description must "apprise the plan's participants and 
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan"); 
29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(j)(2) (SPD for an ERISA welfare plan must 
include "a statement of the conditions pertaining to eligibility 
to receive benefits"); 29 C.F.R. § 250.102-3(l) (SPD must include 
"a statement clearly identifying circumstances which may result 
in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial, loss, forfeiture 
or suspension of any benefits"); 29 C.F.R. § 102-3(s) (SPD must 
include a statement describing "[t]he procedures to be followed 
in presenting claims for benefits under the plan and the remedies 
available under the plan for the redress of claims which are 
denied in whole or in part").  That requirement is relaxed in 
situations where the ERISA plan chooses to provide benefits 
through a qualified HMO.  Under 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-5(a), if 
health benefits are provided through an HMO, the SPD need not 
contain the usual description of the rights of participants or 
beneficiaries, provided the SPD contains a notice stating, among 
  
 The HMOs point to no plan-created right implicated by 
the plaintiffs' state law medical malpractice claims.  The best 
they can do is assert that the plaintiffs' medical malpractice 
claims "attempt to define a participant's rights under the plan."  
(Appellee's bf. in Visconti, at 9.)  We cannot accept that 
characterization.  The plaintiffs are not attempting to define 
new "rights under the terms of the plan"; instead, they are 
attempting to assert their already-existing rights under the  
generally-applicable state law of agency and tort.  Inherent in 
the phrases "rights under the terms of the plan" and "benefits 
due . . . under the terms of [the] plan" is the notion that the 
plan participants and beneficiaries will receive something to 
which they would not be otherwise entitled.  But patients enjoy 
the right to be free from medical malpractice regardless of 
(..continued) 
other things, that plan participants will receive membership "in 
one or more qualified health maintenance organizations," 
§ 2520.102-5(b)(1), and that upon request each available HMO will 
provide certain written information, namely  
 
 (i) the nature of services provided to 
members; (ii) conditions pertaining to 
eligibility to receive such services (other 
than general conditions pertaining to 
eligibility for participation in the plan) 
and circumstances under which services may be 
denied; and (iii) the procedures to be 
followed in obtaining such services, and the 
procedures available for the review of claims 
for services which are denied in whole or in 
part.   
 
§ 2520.102-5(b)(3). 
  
whether or not their medical care is provided through an ERISA 
plan.   
 
 C. 
 Much of the above analysis also precludes us from 
concluding that the plaintiffs are asking the state courts to 
"clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the 
plan."  As noted, there is no allegation here that the HMOs have 
withheld plan benefits due.  Moreover, nothing in the complaints 
remotely resembles a request that the court clarify a right to a 
future benefit; instead, the plaintiffs' complaints center on 
past events. 
    
 D. 
 We recognize that the distinction between the quantity 
of benefits due under a welfare plan and the quality of those 
benefits will not always be clear in situations like this where 
the benefit contracted for is health care services rather than 
money to pay for such services.  There well may be cases in which 
the quality of a patient's medical care or the skills of the 
personnel provided to administer that care will be so low that 
the treatment received simply will not qualify as health care at 
all.  In such a case, it well may be appropriate to conclude that 
the plan participant or beneficiary has been denied benefits due 
under the plan.  This is not such a case, however.  While the 
Dukes complaint alleges that the Germantown Hospital committed 
malpractice when it decided not to perform certain blood tests, 
  
no one would conclude from that malpractice that Germantown 
Hospital was not acting as a health care provider when it made 
those decisions.  Similarly, while the Viscontis claim that Dr. 
Wisniewski was incompetent, there is no indication that he was 
not performing health care services at the time he allegedly 
committed the malpractice charged. 
 We also recognize the possibility that an ERISA plan 
may describe a benefit in terms that can accurately be described 
as related to the quality of the service.  Thus, for example, a 
plan might promise that all X-rays would be analyzed by 
radiologists with a prescribed level of advanced training.  A 
plan participant whose X-ray was analyzed by a physician with 
less than the prescribed training might well be entitled to 
enforce the plan's promise through a suit under § 502(a)(1)(B) to 
secure a denied benefit. 
 Much of the HMOs' argument in these cases is at root a 
contention that the employer and the HMO impliedly contracted 
that the health care services provided would be of acceptable 
quality and, accordingly, that these damage suits rest on a 
failure to provide services of acceptable quality.  Since we do 
not have before us the documents reflecting the agreements 
between the employers and the HMOs, we are not in a position to 
determine whether such a commitment was implicit in their 
respective agreements.  However, the burden of establishing 
removal jurisdiction rests with the defendant.  Abels v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
generally 14A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & 
  
Procedure § 3721, at 209-10 (1985 & Supp. 1995).  Accordingly, 
the HMO is not in a position to press this argument. 
 Moreover, we hasten to add that while we have no doubt 
that all concerned expected the medical services arranged for by 
the HMOs to be of acceptable quality, this seems to us beside the 
point.  The relevant inquiry is not whether there was an 
expectation of acceptably competent services, but rather whether 
there was an agreement to displace the quality standard found in 
the otherwise applicable law with a contract standard. 
 It may well be that an employer and an HMO could agree 
that a quality of health care standard articulated in their 
contract would replace the standards that would otherwise be 
supplied by the applicable state law of tort.  We express no view 
on whether an ERISA plan sponsor may thus by contract opt out of 
state tort law and into a federal law of ERISA contract.  We will 
reserve that issue until a case arises presenting it.5  Nothing 
in this record suggests an agreement to displace the otherwise 
applicable state laws of agency and tort. 
   
 IV. 
                     
5
.  It would seem to Judge Roth that, if a plan were to adopt its 
own standard of acceptable health care to be made available to 
beneficiaries, the plan should provide concurrently, through 
insurance or otherwise, an appropriate remedy to beneficiaries 
for any failure of the plan care providers to meet that standard 
or, in the alternative, should inform plan beneficiaries that 
tort law remedies for medical malpratice would not be available 
to them under the plan. 
  
 The HMOs take heart in a recent case, Corcoran v. 
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 812 (1992), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempts a medical malpractice 
claim against a medical consulting company for decisions it made 
as the third-party administrator of a welfare plan's "pre-
certification" review program.  We agree with the HMOs that under 
Corcoran, third-party private companies may, in some 
circumstances, play a role in an ERISA plan and that claims 
against such companies may fall within the scope of § 502(a).  We 
nevertheless find Corcoran inapposite on the facts and claims 
alleged in this case. 
  Corcoran began as a state law wrongful death action 
against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("Blue Cross") and 
United Heathcare ("United"), in which Florence Corcoran charged 
that the defendants were responsible for the death of her unborn 
fetus.  An employee at South Central Bell Telephone, Corcoran was 
a member of Bell's Medical Assistance Plan ("the Bell Plan"), a 
self-funded welfare-benefit plan which provides medical benefits 
to eligible Bell employees.  The Bell Plan was administered by 
Blue Cross. 
 One provision of the plan, the "Quality Care Program" 
("QCP") required plan participants and beneficiaries to obtain 
advance approval for certain medical procedures and overnight 
hospital visits.  Such cost-containment programs typically are 
known as "utilization review" or "pre-certification review" 
programs.  Under the QCP, once a patient's doctor recommended 
  
surgery or hospitalization, the staff assigned to the QCP was 
required to perform an independent review of the patient's 
condition to determine both the need for the surgery and the 
appropriate length of hospitalization.  As is often the case, the 
Bell Plan hired a third party -- United -- to perform the QCP for 
the Plan.  See generally Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to 
Care in Health Maintenance Organizations:  Toward a Uniform Model 
of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1694, 1677-
83 (1994). 
 Corcoran's doctor, in response to difficulties Corcoran 
was experiencing with her pregnancy, recommended that Corcoran be 
hospitalized.  As a result, Corcoran applied to the Bell Plan for 
disability benefits for the remainder of her pregnancy.  Despite 
the recommendation of Corcoran's doctor, United determined that 
hospitalization was unnecessary, and instead authorized only 10 
hours a day of home nursing care.  The fetus went into distress 
and died during a period of time when the nurse assigned to 
Corcoran was not on duty.  Corcoran subsequently filed suit in 
Louisiana state court against Blue Cross and United. 
 United removed the case to federal district court, 
claiming that Corcoran's claims were completely preempted by 
ERISA.  The district court then granted United's motion to 
dismiss and Corcoran appealed. 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that ERISA preempted Corcoran's claim against United and -- 
implicitly, at least -- that Corcoran's claims were completely 
preempted.  It explained that while United was in fact giving 
  
medical advice, it gave that advice as part of its role of making 
benefit determinations for the plan.  965 F.2d at 1331.  Thus, 
the court determined that plaintiffs were "attempting to recover 
for a tort allegedly committed in the course of handling a 
benefit determination," id. at 1332, and that such state law 
claims are preempted by ERISA.  See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987) (common law cause of action 
arising from "improper processing of a claim for benefits" 
preempted by ERISA); see also Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 
Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (medical malpractice 
claim against plan administrator for delaying pre-certification 
of heart surgery arose from administration of benefits and 
therefore was preempted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); 
Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 923 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(claim against plan sponsor for misrepresenting available 
benefits preempted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991). 
 The HMOs argue that we should read Corcoran broadly to 
hold that medical malpractice claims against an HMO should be 
removable under Metropolitan Life whenever an HMO provides the 
complained-about medical treatment as a benefit of an ERISA-
covered health plan.  They note that several district courts have 
adopted versions of their suggested approach.  See, e.g., Ricci 
v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (plaintiff's 
attempt to hold an HMO liable under a vicarious liability claim 
similar to the ones at bar held preempted); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. 
Supp. 125, 129-30 (D.N.J. 1994) (same); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare 
HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (plaintiff's attempts 
  
to hold an HMO liable under several common law theories held 
preempted); Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp 61, 
63-65 (D. Conn. 1990) (ERISA preempts plaintiff's negligent 
supervision claim against an HMO).  But see Independence HMO, 
Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 987-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (ERISA 
does not preempt medical malpractice-type claims brought against 
HMOs under a vicarious liability theory); Elsesser v. Hospital of 
the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, 802 F. Supp. 
1286, 1290-91 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same for a claim against an HMO 
for the HMO's negligence in selecting, retaining, and evaluating 
plaintiff's primary-care physician).  See also Kearney v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(holding in a case similar to those at bar that ERISA preempts 
plaintiff's direct negligence claim, but not its vicarious 
liability claim). 
 The HMOs' reliance on Corcoran is misplaced.  Although 
United's decisions in Corcoran were in part medical decisions, 
United, unlike the HMOs here, did not provide, arrange for, or 
supervise the doctors who provided the actual medical treatment 
for plan participants.  (Blue Cross played that role in 
Corcoran.)  Instead, United only performed an administrative 
function inherent in the "utilization review."  The difference 
between the "utilization review" and the "arranging for medical 
treatment" roles is crucial for the purposes of § 502(a)(1)(B) 
because only in a utilization-review role is an entity in a 
  
position to deny benefits due under an ERISA welfare plan.6  965 
F.2d at 1333 n.16 (noting that ERISA is implicated in 
"utilization review" decisions but not medical-treatment 
decisions because only the former are "made in connection with a 
cost containment plan"); see also Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 301-03 
(malpractice claims against insurance company hired to perform a 
"pre-certification review" held to fall within § 502(a)'s civil 
enforcement provisions); Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 1290-91 
(holding that the cause of action based on allegations that HMO 
withheld benefits were preempted, while the claims against HMO 
for its negligent selection, retention, and evaluation of a 
primary-care physician were not preempted). 
 In these cases, the defendant HMOs play two roles, not 
just one.7  In addition to the utilization-review role played by 
United in Corcoran, the HMOs also arrange for the actual medical 
treatment for plan participants.  Only this second role is 
relevant for this appeal, however:  on the faces of these 
complaints there is no allegation that the HMOs somehow should be 
held liable for any decisions they might have made while acting 
                     
6
.  As noted in Part III, we are assuming, without deciding, that 
the medical care provided (and not merely the plaintiffs' 
memberships in the respective HMOs) is the plan benefit for the 
purposes of ERISA.  So viewed, when acting in their utilization-
review role, the HMOs are making benefit determinations. 
7
.  There is nothing unusual about this.  HMOs often arrange for 
the medical treatment and perform the utilization review (instead 
of hiring a third party).  See, e.g., Elsesser, 802 F. Supp. at 
1290-91 (HMO playing both roles); see also Stayn, supra, at 1677. 
  
in their utilization-review roles.8  Stated another way, unlike 
Corcoran, there is no allegation here that the HMOs denied anyone 
any benefits that they were due under the plan.  Instead, the  
plaintiffs here are attempting to hold the HMOs liable for their 
role as the arrangers of their decedents' medical treatment.   
 For this reason, these cases are more like Lupo v. 
Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994).  There, an 
employer had contracted with a psychotherapy service group, Human 
Affairs International, Inc. ("HAI"), to provide mental health 
services to its employees in connection with an employee benefit 
plan governed by ERISA.  Lupo, an employee who received 
psychotherapy services from HAI, sued HAI in a state court for 
his therapist's professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  HAI, 
like the HMOs here, removed the case to federal court, claiming 
that ERISA completely preempted Lupo's claims.  The district 
court agreed with HAI, and, accordingly, dismissed Lupo's claim.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that the district court lacked removal jurisdiction and 
was thus obligated to remand to the state court.  It reached this 
conclusion because "[o]n their face, none of [Lupo's] claims 
[bore] any significant resemblance to those described in  
                     
8
.  The only possible exception is Dukes' allegation that the 
Germantown Hospital refused to perform blood studies on Darryl.  
Still, on the record before the court, there is no indication 
that the hospital refused to perform those studies because of the 
ERISA plan's refusal to pay. 
  
[§ 502(a)(1)(B)]."  28 F.3d at 272.  The situation in the cases 
at bar is closely analogous.  As in Lupo, the plaintiffs' claims 
in these cases do not concern a denial of benefits due or a 
denial of some other plan-created right.  Thus, the claims here, 
like those in Lupo, bear no significant resemblance to the claims 
described in § 502(a)(1)(B).  
 
 V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district courts' 
judgments in these cases will be reversed and remanded with 
instructions to remand the cases to the state courts from which 
they came.  Our holding that the districts courts lack removal 
jurisdiction, of course, leaves open for resolution by the state 
courts the issue of whether the plaintiffs' claims are preempted 
under § 514(a). 
